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Race Relations
Donald H. Wollett*
Apparently spurred by impending integration of the public
schools in Orleans Parish and a rash of so-called "sit in" demon-
strations, the 1960 regular session of the legislature passed 35
acts and proposed four constitutional amendments which bear, in
one way or another, on interracial relations.' Space limitations
do not permit treatment of all of this record-breaking output of
legislation. 2 Moreover, as a result of the efforts of the legisla-
ture, sitting in special session, to block implementation of Brown
v. Board of Education in New Orleans, the state law in respect
to public elementary and secondary education has, at the time of
this writing, become so muddled that an intelligent appraisal of
the legal situation is impossible.4
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The legislation falls into the following categories:
Cohabitation and Conception Without Benefit of Ceremony: Acts 73, 75.
Education: Acts 333, 492, 495, 496, 539, 540, 541, 542, 579, 580, 581, 582.
Elections: Acts 82, 484, 485, 537, 538, 613 (constitutional amendment), 622
(constitutional amendment).
Miscellaneous: Acts 18, 68, 81, 83, 304, 544.
Municipal Government: Act 631 (constitutional amendment).
Property Rights and Public Demonstrations: Acts 69, 70, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80.
Public Facilities (generally) : Act 630 (constitutional amendment).
Public Transportation: Act 543.
Public Welfare: Acts 306, 314.
Each of the four constitutional amendments was adopted at the general elec-
tion November 8.
Many of these acts do not purport, on their face, to deal with segregation or
any other aspect of race relations as such. It seems likely, however, on the basis
of the facts set forth in legislative debates, discussions, and comments, that in
operation they will affect primarily the Negro population of the state.
2. In 1958 the legislature adopted a dozen acts intended to apply to six areas
of racial segregation. In 1956 it adopted thirteen such acts. See Reynard, Legis-
lative Symposium: The 1956 Regular Session, 17 LOUISIANA LAw REvIEw 101
(1956). See also 19 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 114 (1958).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. In August the federal district court in New Orleans struck down as un-
constitutional Acts 333, 495, 496, and 542 of 1960 (as well as Act 256 of 1958,
Act 319 of 1956, and Act 555 of 1954). Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board
and Williams v. Davis, 187 F.Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960). The legislature, sitting
in special session beginning early in November, repealed all of these statutes and
enacted a 20-bill package, including five pieces of legislation paralleling the acts
declared unconstitutional in August (but omitting express references to racial
segregation), as well as acts abolishing the Orleans Parish School Board and
placing management and control of its schools in the hands of the legislature.
The court, per Judge Wright, in further proceedings by the parties, promptly
issued a restraining order enjoining enforcement of this package insofar as it
frustrated implementation of the court's long-standing order to desegregate the
New Orleans schools. The legislature countered by addressing four of the five
members of the Orleans Parish School Board out of office. The court, on motion
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Of the balance of this legislative package, the statutes which
are most likely to be of immediate concern to lawyers are Act
613, stiffening the requirements for eligibility to register and
vote; Act 538, requiring that the race of candidates for public
office be designated on the ballot; Act 543, specifying that all
companies providing public transportation shall adopt and en-
force regulations governing the seating of passengers; and Acts
69, 70, 76, 77, 78, 79, and 80 strengthening the law in respect to
the right of owners of private property to discriminate against
invitees and users.
ELECTIONS
Act 613, which was adopted as a constitutional amendment
at the general election November 8, 1960, changes Article VIII,
Section 1, dealing with qualifications to vote, so as to increase
pre-existing requirements in respect to good character and lit-
eracy.
Formerly, the inability to read or write did not operate as a
flat disqualification. The illiterate applicant was entitled to reg-
ister as an elector if he was a person of "good character and
reputation, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
United States and of the State of Louisiana ... able to under-
stand and give a reasonable interpretation of any section of
either Constitution when read to him by the registrar . . . well
disposed to the good order and happiness of the State of Louisi-
ana and of the United States . . . and [able to] understand the
duties and obligations of citizenship under a republican form of
government."
Henceforth, the applicant must be able "to read and write in
the English language, or his mother tongue." Inability to do this,
unless the cause is physical, now operates as a flat disqualifica-
tion even though the applicant possesses good character and rep-
utation. It is noteworthy, however, that this change operates
prospectively only. Illiteracy is not a ground for removal from
the rolls if the person was registered to vote as of November 8,
1960.
Furthermore, the term "good character," which was previous-
ly a requisite for registration but was defined only in the general
terms set forth above, is specified by the amendment to exclude
the following classes of persons: (1) convicted felons who have
not been pardoned; (2) second-offense misdemeanants (other
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than traffic or game law violators) who were sentenced to a jail
term of ninety days or more within the five-year period imme-
diately prior to making application; (3) first-offense misde-
meanants (other than traffic or game law violators) who were
sentenced to a jail term of six months or more within the one-
year period immediately prior to making application; (4) per-
sons who lived together as "common law" spouses 5 within the
five-year period immediately prior to making application; (5)
females who gave birth to an illegitimate child within the five-
year period immediately prior to making application, provided
that conception was not the result of rape or forced carnal knowl-
edge; and (6) males whose paternity of an illegitimate child was
proved or acknowledged within the five-year period immediately
prior to making application. (Living together as man and wife
without ceremony and conceiving and giving birth to two or
more illegitimate children are made crimes by Acts 73 and 75 of
1960, respectively.6 )
These specific exclusions are illustrative, not exclusive. "Bad
character" may still be established on other (unspecified)
grounds. These exclusions, unlike the illiteracy exclusion, appar-
ently may be the basis for removing persons from the rolls who
were registered as of November 8, 1960. 7
Judged solely on their face, these changes appear in the main
to be beyond successful challenge on federal constitutional
grounds. "Privilege of voting is not derived from the United
States, but is conferred by the State and, save as restrained by
the Fifteenth [Amendment] and other provisions of the Federal
Constitution, the State may condition suffrage as it deems ap-
propriate.""
The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits state abridgement of the
right to vote "on account of race, color, or preVious condition of
of "the parties, modified the restraining order so as to include this action. The
legislature made several other moves, too numerous and detailed to recount here,
each of which, if it interfered with the decree directing desegregation, the court
blunted by broadening the restraining order. On December 1, after hearing the
cause sitting as a three-judge tribunal, the court struck down all the statutes
(and five resolutions) which were the subject of Judge Wright's orders and en-
tered an injunction enjoining their enforcement. As of this writing the legisla-
ture remains in session, apparently poised for further action.
5. As defined in Act 73 of 1960, amending Title 14 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950 by adding R.S. 14:79.1, and making common law marriage a
crime.
6. See LA. R.S. 14:79.1, 14:79.2 (Supp. 1960).
7. The removal procedure is set forth in id. 18:132 et seq.
8. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937).
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servitude." This limitation on state power is not transgressed,
in terms, by the 1960 amendment.
In order to show a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment it
probably would be necessary to prove either that the require-
ments had been administered in a discriminatory manner or that
they inherently operate so as to discriminate on the basis of
race.9
Similarly, aside from racial considerations, the standards for
registrants do not appear, with two exceptions, to be vulnerable
to successful attack. The states have a right, so far as the federal
Constitution is concerned, to prescribe literacy tests.10 Moreover,
the exclusion of felons permanently and of lesser criminals tem-
porarily should not generally be regarded, in light of the historic
dimensions of state power to prescribe the qualifications of its
electors, as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." If a
state has the power to try to improve the quality of its electorate
by limiting voters to persons of "good character," it should have
the power to disqualify persons who have been guilty of criminal
activity, for there plainly is a rational relationship between the
two.1 2
The two exceptions, both of which antedate the 1960 amend-
ments and which do raise a serious constitutional question, are
those provisions which give the registrar power to disqualify an
applicant if (a) he is unable "to understand and give a reason-
able interpretation of any section of either Constitution" or (b)
he has "bad character." Such vague standards, it can be argued,
give the reigstrar virtually unlimited discretion to grant or deny
the right to register. A grant of naked and arbitrary power to
9. On the former point, see Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.
1949) (evidence established that registrars applied requirement that electors be
able to "understand and explain" any article of the Federal Constitution more
rigorously to Negroes than to whites), affirmed per curiam, without opinion, 336
U.S. 933 (1949). On the latter point, see Guinn & Beal v. United States, 238
U.S. 347 (1915). Cf. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
10. Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
See also Guinn & Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
11. Compare DeVeau v. Braisted, 80 S. Ct. 1146 (1960), holding that a state
statute barring convicted felons from office in waterfront unions does not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment (nor does it constitute ex post facto legislation or a
bill of attainder). See also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (18.90), holding that
a territory of the United States may deny the franchise to a person who commits
the crime of polygamy, advocates polygamy, or belongs to an organization which
advocates polygamy.
12. The fact that it takes only one illegitimate child to make a "bad char-
acter" while it takes two to make a crime should not be of controlling significance.
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an administrative official to give or withhold consent amounts to
a denial of equal protection of the laws.'8
There is one other aspect of this matter which may prove
troublesome.
The proposition that an inquiry into the ulterior motives of
a legislature is not proper judicial business is an old and re-
spected constitutional law principle.14 However, it has been bent,
if not fractured, in many of the cases involving claims of racial
discrimination. See, for example, Davis v. Schnell,15 where the
court stated: "We cannot ignore the impact of the Boswell
Amendment upon Negro citizens because it avoids mention of
race or color; 'To do this would be to shut our eyes to what all
others than we can see and understand.'" See also Bush v. Or-
leans Parish School Board, 6 where the court said, in striking
down a Louisiana statute empowering the governor to close any
school threatened with violence or disorder: "Although the right
of the Governor to close schools under Act 542 of 1960 is not in
terms predicated on their integration, the purpose of the act is
so clear that its purpose speaks louder than its words."
Illiteracy is not a ground for removal from the rolls if the
person was registered to vote as of November 8, 1960. Appar-
ently, however, "bad character" or the "absence of good char-
acter" is a ground for removal no matter when the elector regis-
tered. Why did the legislature draw this distinction? Was it
based upon a finding of fact that use of the illiteracy test as a
ground for removal of persons registered prior to the cut-off
date would remove many white persons as well as Negroes from
the rolls, while use of the general character test, administered
by registrars empowered to exercise almost unlimited discretion,
would result in disenfranchisement of a disproportionate number
of the latter?
If the facts supporting the existence of such legislative
motives exist and are judicially noticed, this part of the 1960
changes in the State Constitution will be in trouble as a possible
transgression of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Furthermore, if the exclusions of specific classes of persons
13. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), affirmed, 336 U.S.
933 (1949). Compare Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360
U.S. 45 (1959).
14. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
15. 81 F. Supp. 872, 881 (S.D. Ala. 1949).
.16. 187 F. Supp. 42, 45 (E.D. La. 1960).
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are construed so as to include persons who engaged in the de-
scribed conduct prior to the effective date of the amendment,
those that cover acts that were criminal (but not felonious) at
the time they were committed are subject to challenge on the
ground that they are intended, not to improve the electoral proc-
ess, but to impose additional punishment for past criminal activ-
ity, and therefore amount to ex post facto laws.17 Those that
cover acts that were not criminal at the time they were commit-
ted are subject to challenge, not only on this ground, but also as
bills of attainder, that is, legislative findings that members of an
identifiable class are guilty of an offense against the community
for past conduct and prescribing punishment therefor.'5
These troublesome questions can be avoided, of course, by in-
terpreting the amendment as meaning that the specifications of
"bad character" (with the exception of those covering persons
whose conduct constituted a felony)' 9 refer to conduct which oc-
curred after the effective date of the amendment.
Act 53820 provides that, upon the basis of information pro-
vided by the candidates, party officials and boards of election
supervisors shall show in each certification to the Secretary of
State whether the named candidate is of "the Caucasian race,
Negro race, or other specified race." This information shall be
printed on "the ballots to be used in any state or local primary,
general or special election" within parentheses beside the name
of each candidate "in print of the same size as the print in the
names of the candidates."
The Supreme Court's disposition in recent years of state leg-
islation concerning racial matters, some of it rather cavalier, 21
inevitably casts a shadow of doubt on this statute. However,
none of these cases is in point, and it is difficult to identify the
principle of constitutional law which justifies such doubt.
17. Compare De Veau v. Braisted, 80 S. Ct. 1146, 1155 (1960). See also Cum-
mings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U.S. 1867). But see Hawker v. New York, 170
U.S. 189 (1898) and Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S.
716 (1951). The leading case is still Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (U.S. 1798).
18. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri,
4 Wall. 277 (1867).
19. These arguments have little or no force with respect to unpardoned felons
becahse their disenfranchisement antedates the 1960 amendment by a good many
years. See LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6; LA. R.S. 18:42 (1950).
20. Amending Title 18 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 by adding
R.S. 18 :1174.1.
21. See Wollett, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959
Term - Constitutional Law, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 277, 281, 283 (1960).
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The right to run for public office, federal, state, or local, is
protected to some extent by the Fourteenth Amendment. How-
ever, it is also clear that the states have wide latitude in regulat-
ing this aspect of the electoral process. For example, Gerende v.
Board of Supervisors of Baltimore City22 holds that a state has
the power to require a candidate for municipal office, as a con-
dition of appearance on the ballot, to swear that he is neither
engaged in attempting to overthrow the government by force or
violence nor is he knowingly a member of an organization en-
gaged in such an attempt. An implicit assumption of the short
per curiam opinion is that state power, while properly exercised
in that instance, is not unlimited.
Doubtless an eligibility requirement grounded upon race
would fall outside permissible limits. However, Act 538 does not
do this. It does not restrict, on the basis of race, the ability of
persons to seek public office or to appear on the ballot. It re-
quires only that the candidate identify the racial group to which
he belongs, the information to be officially disclosed, i.e., on the
ballot, as a part of the election apparatus.
A possible line of attack, although its success would require
a considerable extension of existing case law, might proceed on
the theory, by analogy to cases involving public employment,
that while a state may require the disclosure of information
as a condition of exercising certain rights and privileges, the
facts thus sought must be information which the state has a
legitimate interest in securing, i.e., relevant to fitness to exer-
cise the right or privilege involved.23 Under this approach, it
would be argued that race, as such, is irrelevant to one's ability
to hold public office. Therefore, the state cannot require a per-
son, as a condition of candidacy, to identify the group to which
he belongs.
Furthermore, pursuing the logic of this principle, a state
may not (regardless of the source of information) systematically
disclose, as a part of the official election process, facts about a
candidate which are irrelevant to his fitness, e.g., his race.
Obviously a decision predicated upon such grounds would
raise many troublesome questions. What of other facts about
22. 341 U.S. 56 (1951). See also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
23. Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951)
Beilan v. Board of Public Education, School District of Philadelphia, 357 U.S.
399 (1958) ; Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
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a candidate- religion, sex, age, national origin, place of birth,
etc.? Are they irrelevant? Does it make a difference what the
office is? The basic difficulty is that the standard for deter-
mining irrelevance, viz., fitness for public office, is the very
question which is being submitted to the judgment of the elec-
torate. It would seem singularly inappropriate for a court to
decide, upon the basis of its notions as to what constitutes fitness
for public office, that certain facts about candidates are irrele-
vant, and upon that basis to determine (i.e., censor) the infor-
mation the state may officially impart to the body politic. It
is a fundamental part of our constitutional fabric that each
voter is free to decide, on the basis of any and all information
he possesses - including race, religion, or what not - whether a
particular candidate is fit to hold the office he seeks.
On the other hand, it seems equally inappropriate for the
state, as a part of its management of the electoral process, sys-
tematically to disclose a particular single fact about each candi-
date, thereby conveying an official judgment to the voter that
this fact is not only relevant but also should be regarded as
controlling.
Inappropriate state action is not the same thing as uncon-
stitutional state action. However, it can be forcefully argued
that the Supreme Court's extension of Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation to a wide range of public facilities other than schools
means that it has adopted an interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment which requires a state, in all of its official actions,
to be indifferent to racial considerations. 24 The principle of
official indifference is manifestly violated when a state, in dis-
charging one of its most precious functions, singles out the race
of each candidate for the special attention of the electorate,
thereby encouraging the decisive practice of "block" voting.
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE INVITEES AND USERS OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY
The 1960 legislature, by the enactment of seven acts, all of
which amend the Criminal Code, made participation in so-called
24. This is essentially the rationale of the cases holding that, while a state is
not required by the Constitution of the United States to operate a public school
system. It is not only a denial of equal protection but it is also a deprivation of
liberty or property without due process of law to close a particular school in order
to avoid its integration. James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959).
See also Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aff'd sub nom.
Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959).
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"sit in" demonstrations a very hazardous business. Persons who
engage in such conduct may, as a result of the new legislation,
be guilty of the following criminal offenses: disturbing the peace
(and, in in some cases, aggravated battery), disorderly conduct,
criminal mischief, criminal trespass, and obstructing public pas-
sages. Moreover, if such a person flees the arresting officer
after notice of arrest, manifests "resistance or opposition" after
actual arrest, or refuses to identify himself, he is guilty of the
crime of resisting an officer.2 5
The penalties are severe. A particular "sit in" demonstrator
would, if his conduct constituted a violation of all of these
statutes, be subject to aggregate punishment of $3500 in fines,
four years and four months imprisonment, or both.26
More specifically, the new legislation provides as follows.
Disturbing the Peace
R.S. 14:103.1 (added by Act 69) : A person is guilty of dis-
turbing the peace if he "with intent to provoke a breach of the
peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the peace
may be ocasioned thereby: (1) crowds or congregation [sic]
with others . . . in or upon ... any ... public place or building,
... or any . . .place of business engaged in selling or serving
members of the public, or in or around any free entrances to
any such place of business or public building, or to any building
owned by another ... and who fails . . . to disperse ... or move
on, when ordered so to do by any law enforcement officer ... or
any other authorized person, or (2) insults or makes rude or
obscene remarks or gestures .. .or indecent proposals . . .or
disturbs or obstructs or interferes [to, toward, or with] another
or others, or (3) while in or on any ... vehicle engaged in trans-
porting members of the public for a fare or charge, causes a
disturbance or does or says [the things set forth in (2) above]
or (4) refuses to leave the premises of another when requested
so to do by any owner, lessee, or any employee thereof. .. ."
If the aforementioned conduct leads to an actual breach of
25. Act 76 of 1960, amending Section 108 of Title 14 of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950.
26. If the "sit in" demonstrator's conduct constitutes disturbing the peace under
R.S. 14:103.1 (Supp. 1960) (added by Act 69) and leads to an actual breach of
the peace, or incites a riot causing injury, he is guilty of an aggravated battery
and subject to a maximum prison term of ten years. See LA. R.S. 14:34.1 (Supp.
1960) (also added by Act 69).
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the peace or incites a riot and as a result a person or persons are
injured or killed, the offense is converted from disturbing the
peace into aggravated battery.
27
Disorderly Conduct
R.S. 14:103(B) (added by Act 70): A person is guilty of
disorderly conduct (and disturbing the peace) if he "while in
or on the premises of another . . .on which property any . . .
lawful business is operated which engages in selling articles of
merchandise or services or accommodation to members of the
public, or engages generally in business transactions with mem-
bers of the public . . . (1) [seeks] to prevent or . .. interfere
with the owner or operator of [the] business, or his agents or
employees, [in pursuit of] his .. .business with customers or
prospective customers or other members of the public who may
then be in such building, or (2) [seeks] to prevent or . . .
interfere with other persons who are expressly or impliedly
invited upon [the] premises, or with prospective customers
coming into or frequenting such premises in the normal course
of the operation of the business ......
Criminal Mischief
R.S. 14:59(6) (added by Act 77) : The crime of criminal
mischief now includes "[t]aking temporary possession of any
part or parts of a place of business, or remaining in a place
of business after the person in charge of such business or por-
tion of such business has ordered such person to leave the
premises and to desist from the temporary possession of any
part or parts of such business."
Criminal Trespass
R.S. 14:63.3 and R.S. 14:63.4 (added by Acts 78 and 79,
respectively) :
The former subsection prohibits any person, without au-
thority of law, from going into or upon or from remaining in
or upon "any structure ... which belongs to another [including
movables and public buildings and structures] or any part...
thereof, after having been forbidden to do so, either orally or
in writing, including by means of any sign [posted at a place
27. See LA. R.S. 14:34.1 (Supp. 1960), added by La. Acts 1960, No. 69.
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where it may reasonably be expected to be seen], by any owner,
lessee, or custodian of the property or by any other authorized
person ... "
The latter subsection makes it a crime (a) for any person to
"incite, solicit, urge, encourage, exhort, instigate or procure"
any other person to engage in conduct prohibited by the former
subsection, with knowledge that the other person "has been for-
bidden to go or remain" in or upon the structure or a part there-
of, and (b) for any person, upon demand of any "law enforce-
ment officer" who is investigating the question of whether he
is in violation of the act or who has arrested him for such viola-
tion to fail "to identify himself [name and address] to such
officer."
Obstructing Public Passages
R.S. 14:100.1 (added by Act 80) : With specified exceptions
for safety measures necessitated by construction or maintenance
work or otherwise taken by governmental authorities, it is now
a crime for a person wilfully to "obstruct the free, convenient
and normal use of any public sidewalk, street, highway, bridge,
alley, road, or other passageway, or the entrance, corridor or
passage of any public building, structure, water craft or ferry,
by impeding, hindering, stifling, retarding or restraining traffic
or passage thereon or therein."
Each of the foregoing acts (except for Act 77 dealing with
criminal mischief) contains a proviso exempting from its opera-
tion "a bona fide legitimate labor organization or ... any of its
legal activities such as picketing, lawful assembly or concerted
activity in the interest of its members for the purpose of ac-
complishing or securing more favorable wage standards, hours
of employment and working conditions."
Although there is little doubt that the "sit in" demonstrations
last spring protesting racially discriminatory service and access
policies and practices by business establishments operating
restaurants or food counters occasioned the passage of these
six acts, they are not in terms aimed at such activities, nor are
they designed narrowly to vindicate the right of private property
owners to discriminate against the users of their premises on
the basis of race.
Instead, they deal in broad terms with such matters as crowds
1960]
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that fail to disperse when ordered to do so by police officers,
refusals to leave property owned by another when requested to
do so, entering property owned by another against the wishes of
the owner, and the right of property owners to prescribe the
terms and conditions under which any person may enter and
use their property.
Accordingly, at least insofar as matters of race relations
are concerned, these statutes are not subject to attack on their
face. Any significant constitutional questions are apt to arise
in the context of litigation in which they are applied to par-
ticular conduct.
The basic pattern of behavior in the typical "sit in" dem-
onstration is as follows. Four or five Negroes situate them-
selves in that part of a privately owned eating facility, e.g., a
lunch counter in a drugstore, reserved for whites only, request-
ing service. The proprietor or his agent asks them to leave.
They refuse or fail to comply with his request. He summons
the police, who remove them from the premises. There is no
violence or force, and no threatening language is used.
May a state constitutionally punish the Negroes for such con-
duct where the proofs make it clear that the proprietor's re-
fusal to extend service and his request that they leave the area
were based solely on the fact of their race?
It has long been considered to be well established that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit a private entrepreneur
from excluding persons from his property or parts thereof or
otherwise discriminating against them in the conduct of his
business, the services he renders, etc., no matter what the rea-
son.28 But Shelley v. Kraemer29 holds that a judicial decree
enforcing a private right to discriminate on the basis of race
(derived from a restrictive covenant in a real property deed)
is state action which denies a Negro vendee equal protection of
the laws. Accordingly, it can be argued that Shelley v. Kraemer
means that a criminal conviction vindicating the right of a pri-
vate entrepreneur to discriminate in his service and access
policies and practices on the basis of race is also state action
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, there are distinguishing factors.
28. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
29. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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First, in Shelley v. Kraemer the plaintiff sought a state court
injunction, the effect of which was to force another person (the
vendor of the real property) to discriminate, against his will,
between and among vendees on the basis of race.80 This is not
true of the typical "sit in" situation where the complaining party
is seeking state support of his right to discriminate. He is not
trying to impose his will on others.
Secondly, the Supreme Court thus far, in dealing with the
implications of Shelley v. Kraemer, has refused to extend it to
defensive recognition by a state court of a private right to dis-
criminate on the basis of race.3 1 Suppose, in the typical "sit in"
situation, that the owner of the property, instead of seeking the
assistance of the state to vindicate his right to discriminate,
chooses to utilize self-help for that purpose, that is, to use rea-
sonable force to remove the Negro from his premises. If the
Negro subsequently sues him for assault and battery or causes
a criminal proceeding to be initiated, and the defendant pleads
a privilege to use reasonable force to remove a trespasser, the
court's action in sustaining the defense would not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.
If private implementation of the right to discriminate is per-
missible in a trespass-to-real-property situation arising out of a
"sit in," but the Court holds that affirmative state vindication
of that right by imposing a criminal sanction is not, it will
thereby encourage the use of self-help, a situation hardly cal-
culated to improve either race relations or the maintenance of
law and order. The undesirability of such a result is a policy
consideration which strongly militates against the extension of.
Shelley v. Kraemer.
A more troublesome question is raised by the Supreme Court's.
decision in Marsh v. Alabama.32 In that case all of the property
in the town of Chickasaw, including the street and sidewalk
running alongside the "business block" (consisting of buildings
leased to merchants), belonged to the Gulf Shipbuilding Cor-
poration. The company, which had posted a notice prohibiting
solicitation of any kind on its property, objected to the presence.
30. This was also true in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), extending
the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer to a judgment for damages.
31. See Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), 349 U.S-
70 (1955).
32. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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of a Jehovah's Witness who was distributing religious literature
on the sidewalk. She refused to leave upon request, whereupon
the company caused her arrest. Subsequently she was prosecuted
for, and convicted of, criminal trespass, that is, entering or
remaining on the premises of another after having been warned
not to do so.
The Supreme Court set aside the conviction on the ground
that, whether a town is privately or publicly owned, the public
has an identical interest in its functioning in such manner that
constitutional liberties, e.g., freedom of religious discussion, may
be freely exercised. The managers of the town, said the Court,
cannot interfere with their exercise, and a criminal conviction
which vindicates such an interference violates the First Amend-
ment as written into the Fourteenth.
Again, as in the case of Shelley v. Kraemer, there are dis-
tinguishing factors. But they are not such as to be very re-
assuring to those who believe that the personal freedom to choose
one's associates, whether in the home, the apartment house, on
the street, or in the office or the store, is a civil liberty of the
first magnitude, and that the basis of the choice is private, not
public business.
Marsh v. Alabama involved rights protected by the First
Amendment, which the Court seems to regard as enjoying a
preferred position in the galaxy of liberties protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. But it would take a bold prophet to
predict with confidence that the Court is not disposed, in 1960,
to give as much protection to the interests of Negroes in gaining
full and unrestricted access to all areas of community life as it
gave in 1946 to the interests of a peddler of religious tracts.
Marsh v. Alabama involved a company town, indistinguish-
able from any other town with a shopping center except for the
fact that title to the property happened to belong to a private
corporation. It did not involve an isolated hotel, theater, or
restaurant. But why, in the language of the Court, did the
owner's right to discriminate between and among users of his
property have to give way? Because the area was "accessible
to and freely used by the public in general," because the "owner,
for his advantage," had opened up "his property for use by the
public in general," and because "facilities ... built and operated
primarily to benefit the public" perform "essentially a public
function."
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Are not these considerations equally applicable to restaurants
located in intrastate bus depots and hotels? And is there any-
thing more than a shaded degree's difference between these
facilities and a lunch counter situated in a department store?
There are, of course, countervailing considerations that weigh
against such an extension of Marsh v. Alabama. The opinion in
that case is built on the logic that the corporate property owner
could not enlist the support of the court in vindicating its right
to discriminate against users of the property because its action
was state action, itself violative of Marsh's constitutional guar-
antees. In other words, if the corporation, instead of causing
Marsh's arrest and prosecution under state law, had simply
ejected her from the premises, it thereby would have taken action
as fully unconstitutional as the criminal conviction. 33
However, with the exception of Terry v. Adams, 3 4 which in-
volved the hypersensitive area of the Fifteenth Amendment,
rather than the Fourteenth, the Court has refused to regard
functional criteria, that is, what service is performed or what
activity is carried on, as controlling the question of whether
private action takes on the character of state action.8 5 There are
practical reasons compelling the Court to adhere to this position.
If it abandons it, it will cast itself onto a poorly charted
sea, largely unmarked except for a few dimly lighted and shift-
ing navigational aids. The tests of Marsh v. Alabama do not fix
a clear course. In a sense every person who has a place of busi-
ness from which he markets goods or services directly to the
public has "for his advantage" opened up "his property for use
by the public in general." And it is "accessible to and freely used
by the public." Every private school and every non-profit hos-
pital are "built and operated primarily to benefit the public."
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in the Civil Rights Cases,86
stood on the Thirteenth Amendment, which -has no express re-
33. And within the reach of federal civil rights legislation enacted to implement
the guarantees of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 1343. Compare Williams v. Howard Johnson's
Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959).
34. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Compare Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
35: See, e.g., Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541
(1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950) (large apartment development) ; In re
Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958) (private school) ; Eaton v. Board of Man-
agers of the James Walker Memorial Hospital, 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959) (private hospital).
36. 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883).
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quirement of state action, and argued that it reaches all in-
dividuals and corporations that exercise "public functions" and
"wield power and authority under the state," e.g., common car-
riers, inns and hotels, and places of public amusement. This
formulation is broad enough to cover all corporations, since they
are either chartered by the state or empowered to do business
there; and almost surely would include such things as private
housing developments and recreational facilities.
On the other hand, if the Court adheres to the position that
private action does not become state action solely because of the
kind of service performed or activity carried on, it follows that
the owner or operator may continue to practice discrimination
by using private means, e.g., ejecting trespassers himself. If
he can do this but cannot get state assistance, the result, as
pointed out above in discussing Shelley v. Kraemer, will militate
against peace and good order in the community.
In any event, there is a slight measure of comfort to be
gleaned from the fact that, no matter how the "sit in" cases
come out, the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment ap-
parently stop operating at the household door. At least the Court
seems to concede in the Marsh case that a homeowner has the
right, without fear of offending the Constitution, to regulate the
conduct of his guests.
There are two other constitutional issues that are apt to
arise in the application of these six statutes.
First, Acts 78 and 79, which deal, respectively, with criminal
trespass and inciting to criminal trespass, include public build-
ings and structures in the property, or any part thereof, from
which persons may be excluded by, for example, posting a sign.
It seems too clear for serious argument that these statutes can-
not constitutionally be interpreted and applied so as to support
systematic exclusions from the public domain on a racial basis.
The one likely exception is the situation where public premises
are leased to private persons for the purpose of carrying on
some activity which is totally unrelated to the discharge of
public business. The mere fact, for example, that a restaurant
business is conducted by a corporate lessee on property which
the state happens to own (perhaps as a profitable investment
of public funds) should not make its policy of serving "Whites
[Vol. XXI
LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
only" state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.8 7
However, this exception is likely to be given narrow, not
broad, scope. It should not be supposed that the state can, by
the simple device of delegating the performance of public func-
tions under leasing arrangements, avoid its obligation not to
restrict access to public property solely by reason of race. For
instance, a cafeteria located in a public building housing state
agencies is performing a public function, not only because it is
situated in a structure financed by tax revenues but also because
its operation facilitates the discharge of public business. Its pur-
pose and function are to benefit state employees and the public
at large. A practice of restricting service to white persons would
doubtless be regarded as state action, even though the operator
happened to be a corporate concessionaire.18
The second constitutional question is highlighted by the
exemption from five of the six statutes of "picketing, lawful
assembly or concerted activity" by trade unions. (Act 77 dealing
with criminal mischief is the one exception, presumably because
attaching the exemption to this statute would have amounted to
an implicit legislative endorsement of union expropriation of
employer property by means of "sit down" strikes.)
Inclusion of this exculpatory language in five of the statutes
doubtless reflects the influence of the labor lobby. Such an
exemption is a comforting thing to have, and it will prove
useful, particularly at the police and trial court levels, if there
is any attempt to apply these laws to union activities.
However, because of developments in federal constitutional
law in the past twenty years, it is largely surplusage.
Unless there is violence or disorder, a state lacks power to
regulate trade union conduct which is arguably either protected
or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act if it occurs in
an industry over which the National Labor Relations Board will
take jurisdiction. Most of the traditional economic weapons
37. Compare Wilmington Parking Authority v. Burton, 157 A.2d 894 (Dela.
1960).
38. Compare Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954),
reversing per curiam, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953).
39. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959),
and Section 14 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 141, as amended
in 1959 by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519.
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used by unions to gain their objectives, striking, picketing, boy-
cotting, unfair listing, etc., fall in this category.
Secondly (and more to the point of this discussion), the
dissemination of information, opinions, and points of view about
an employer's labor relations policies and the importuning of
persons not to patronize him are within the area of free discus-
sion protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States as read into the Fourteenth. 40 Furthermore,
meetings and assemblies held for such purposes are equally
protected against governmental interference. 41
Peaceful picketing involves persons patrolling a particular
locality with placards, identifying, in a sense, a place of quaran-
tine. It may induce action irrespective of the ideas that are
being disseminated, and produce consequences and evoke and
exact loyalties and responses different from other modes of
communication. Therefore, it is not regarded as the legal
equivalent of speech by the printed or spoken word. Accordingly,
a state may restrain the dissemination of information, opinions,
and points of view about an employer's labor relations policies
by means of picketing if its objective is to force the employer
(a) to commit an unlawful act,42 or (b) to transgress a valid
state policy. 48 However, other means for telling the union's side
of the story, such as speeches, handbills, and unfair lists, ap-
parently enjoy full First Amendment protection. 44
Moreover, peaceful picketing, despite its nonspeech aspects,
cannot be restrained except narrowly on the ground that its
objective is improper.45 It plainly cannot be restricted solely
because it is effective, as for example, when some customers
or potential customers are influenced to take their business else-
where.
As the Court said in the Thornhill case: "It may be that
effective exercise of the means of advancing public knowledge
may persuade some of those reached to refrain from entering
into advantageous relations with the business establishment
40. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
41. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
42. Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
43. International Bro. of Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
44. See NLRB v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 263 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 940 (1960).
45. See Chauffeurs, etc., Local Union v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958), revers-
ing per curiam, 181 Kan. 898, 317 P.2d 817 (1957).
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which is the scene of the dispute. Every expression of opinion
on matters that are important has the potentiality of inducing
action in the interests of one rather than another group in
society. '46 Since influencing the listener or the reader is the
purpose of speaking or writing about controversial matters, it
cannot be interdicted merely on a showing that it may be taken
seriously. If this were not so, the First Amendment would be
reduced to a guarantor of ineffectual speech only.
It is clear, then, that even if the legislature had not carved
out an exemption for trade union "picketing, lawful assembly
or concerted activity," constitutional considerations would large-
ly foreclose application of these laws to such conduct. It is also
clear that, despite the failure of the legislature to so provide,
constitutional considerations compel statutory interpretations
which in effect will exempt other groups whose conduct falls
within the principles underlying the trade union cases.
There can be little doubt, recurring to the "sit in" situation,
that the dissemination of information, opinions, and points of
view about a company's racially restrictive service and access
policies and the importuning of persons not to patronize it are
as fully protected by the First Amendment as the dissemination
of facts and ideas about the company's labor relations policies.4
It follows that the decisions discussed above operate as a restric-
tion on the applicability of the statutes under consideration.
Thus, for example, suppose two or three Negroes picket on
the sidewalk in front of a drug store, carrying signs protesting
its racially discriminatory practices in the operation of its lunch
counter and requesting the public to take their business else-
where. It is unlikely that they could, in the absence of evidence
showing physical interference with the movement of persons,
threats, or the like, be convicted under Act 80 of the crime of
obstructing the "free, convenient and normal use of any public
sidewalk . . . by impeding, hindering, stifling, retarding or
restraining traffic or passage thereon."
Nor could the picketing be restrained on the ground that it
had an unlawful objective, to wit, forcing the drug store to
integrate its lunch counter, for a state law or policy which re-
quires racial discrimination is invalid. 48
46. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940).
47. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
48. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) ; Dorsey v. State Athletic
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Suppose a crowd gathers around the three Negro pickets,
shouting names and otherwise manifesting an ugly mood border-
ing on violence. If the police ask the pickets to disperse and
move on, and they fail or refuse to do so, can they constitution-
ally be convicted of disturbing the peace (or, if a riot occurs
and someone is hurt or killed, of aggravated battery) under
Act 69? If the proofs establish that the pickets intended to
provoke a breach of the peace, as, for example, by name-calling
or inciting to violence, the answer is yes. "Abridgment of the
liberty of . . . discussion can be justified . . . where the clear
danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording
no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for
acceptance in the market of public opinion." 49
If the proofs do not establish such an intent, the answer is
cloudy. Under the language of Act 69 it is enough if a person
"crowds" with others in or upon a public place or in or around
the entrance to a building owned by another "under circum-
stances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned
thereby." The 1951 decision in Feiner v. New York 50 suggests
that a conviction on these facts might be constitutional. How-
ever, Feiner's speech was punctuated with epithets, included
exhortations to Negroes to rise up in arms and fight for equal
rights, and was so inflammatory that it manifested an intent to
cause disorder. The situation posed here is not of that sort.
In 1950 the Supreme Court unanimously sustained the power
of California to enjoin picketing for the purpose of forcing an
employer to hire Negro employees in the same proportion as it
had Negro customers (about 50 per cent) on the ground that
the purpose offended a state policy of prohibiting discrimination
in employment on the basis of race. 51 The Court apparently
accepted, as a valid ground for restraint, the state's belief that
such picketing should be prohibited because it tends to increase
"community tensions and conflicts."' 2 The same thing may be
said about picketing protesting segregated lunch counters. How-
ever, the teaching of the 1958 decision in Cooper v. Aaron ' is
Commission, 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958), affirmed per curiam, 359 U.S.
533 (1959) ; Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affirming per curiam, 142
F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
49. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-105 (1940).
50. 340 U.S. 315 (1951). But see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
51. Bughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
52. Id. at 464.
53. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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that the prevention of violence and inter-racial friction is not a
valid reason for maintaining racially segregated public schools.
The state's duty is to maintain order by controlling the mob,
not by suppressing persons in the exercise of their constitutional
rights. The same reasoning might prevail in the hypothetical
situation under discussion.
The foregoing analysis is applicable not only to picketing, but
also to street corner speeches, the distribution of pamphlets, and
meetings in public places. Of course it is clear that a state or
municipality does not have to tolerate physical interference with
vehicular and pedestrian traffic and that it may make and en-
force reasonable regulations as to the circumstances (e.g., times
and places) under which speaking, pamphleteering, and assem-
bling may take place.
PRIVATE COMPANIES PROVIDING PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
Act 543, a new piece of legislation, provides that all com-
panies operating busses or street cars for hire, no matter what
the form of business organization, shall adopt and enforce regula-
tions governing the seating of their passengers. Any passenger
who refuses to comply with such regulations "peacefully and
without disorder" shall be fined not more than $500.00 or im-
prisoned for not more than 60 days, or both. Similar penalties
are visited upon any operating company that fails to adopt such
regulations and enforce them.
There is nothing in the statute to indicate the exact nature
of the regulations which must be promulgated and carried out.
It is enough if they are "for the seating of passengers." How-
ever, the background of Act 543 strongly suggests a legislative
preference in the matter.
The Louisiana statutes requiring racially segregated seating
arrangements on busses and street cars were declared uncon-
stitutional in 1958. 5 4 The legislature repealed them at its regular
session the same year. 55
Act 543 apparently is grounded on the expectation that pri-
vately-owned companies will take the hint and adopt and enforce
seating regulations which conform to the policies of the former
54. Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
968 (1958).
55. See Reynard, Segregation (Legislative Symposium), 19 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEw 114, 121 (1958).
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statutes. Presumably the hope is that the absence of any com-
mand in Act 543 that the rules shall provide for racially segre-
gated seating arrangements will make their enforcement private
rather than state action and therefore outside the command of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Here again, as in the case of the discussion of Marsh v.
Alabama, the success or failure of this stratagem depends largely
upon whether the courts regard the activity to be such that its
management takes on the color of state action. There are factors
which bring this case somewhat closer to the "public function"
category than those involving hotels, schools, hospitals, and hous-
ing developments, and a good deal closer than those involving
ten-cent stores and similar retail establishments. A privately
owned and operated transportation system is typically a fran-
chised monopoly closely regulated by the municipality. It is the
beneficiary of public assistance in return for which it subjects
itself to a high degree of public control.
Recently the Fifth Circuit, in Boman v. Birmingham Transit
Company,' 6 struck down bus company regulations calling for
racially segregated seating on the ground that its conduct could
"fairly be said to be that of the State of Alabama." The ordi-
nance of the City of Birmingham pursuant to which the company
promulgated the regulation at issue roughly paralleled Act 543.
It authorized (but did not direct) the adoption of such rules
governing seating arrangements, made a passenger's willful re-
fusal to obey a bus operator's attempt to enforce them a breach
of the peace, and omitted any reference to segregation.
The court's reasoning was as follows. Under Alabama law
no person may use city streets and other public property for a
commercial enterprise without the consent of the municipality,
i.e., a franchise. A municipality has authority to franchise a
particular use of public property in order to serve "public neces-
sity or convenience." It also has the authority to prescribe those
terms for the exercise of the franchise as may be dictated by
such considerations.
A municipality may, in the exercise of that power, promul-
gate a regulation governing seating arrangements in busses. Or
it may, as it did here, formally delegate its authority to the bus
company. Since the company's authority to decide what seating
. 56. 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
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regulations will serve "public necessity or convenience" is de-
rived from the municipality, its exercise of that authority is
municipal action. Accordingly, "so long as such an ordinance
was in force, the acts of the Bus Company in requiring racially
segregated seating were state acts and were thus violative of
the appellant's constitutional rights. 5 7 An injunction should be
issued prohibiting the company from enforcing the rules.
It is important to understand what the court did not decide.
It did not decide that, when an ordinary business corporation
exercises the power derived from its charter, its actions are state
actions. The holding is restricted to the exercise of powers under
special or public utility franchises which permit the private use
of state property for the performance of "public functions."
Nor did the court decide that racially discriminatory regula-
tions by a franchised public utility constitute state action in the
absence of a formal delegation of power. This question remains
open.
However, it is difficult to see, on the court's reasoning, why
this fact should be controlling. The absence of a formal delega-
tion of power to promulgate and enforce seating regulations
does not alter the fact that the company is using city streets
to perform the "public function" of running a bus service. It
means only that the company's authority to decide what seating
regulations will serve "public necessity or convenience," instead
of being derived from a permissive statute or ordinance, is
derived from the franchise. The character of the function is in
nowise changed, and the power to perform it still comes from
the state. Accordingly, the acts of the bus company in requiring
racially segregated seating would remain state acts, violative of
the passengers' constitutional rights.
The court's opinion states: "Of course, the simple company
rule that Negro passengers must sit in back and white pas-
sengers must sit in front, while an unnecessary affront to a
large group of its patrons, would not effect a denial of constitu-
tional right if not enforced by force or by threat of arrest and,
criminal action."5 8 (Emphasis supplied.) The statement is am-
biguous, but apparently it means that the company has the right
to discriminate on a racial basis provided that its passengers
57. Id. at 534.
58. Id. at 535.
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are willing to be discriminated against. If they are not, the com-
pany cannot obtain compliance either by threatening arrest and
criminal action or by using force, e.g., ejecting the recalcitrant
passengers.
In short, the company has a right but no remedy which, in a
legal sense, is the same thing as having no right at all, and the
reason the company has no legal right is because its acts are
state acts, themselves violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The absence or presence of an ordinance or statute specifically
making the violation of company seating rules a crime is im-
material.
This analysis emphasizes against the soundness of the propo-
sition, discussed above in connection with the possible extension
of Shelley v. Kraemer and Marsh v. Alabama to the "sit in"
demonstrations, that vindication by legal process of the right
of a private entrepreneur to discriminate on the basis of race
should not be regarded as state action within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment unless the conduct of the entrepre-
neur itself constitutes state action. The contrary view, to wit,
that there is a private right to discriminate which may be en-
forced by self-help but not by resort to the courts, will encourage
the resolution of disputes by force rather than by the orderly
process of law.
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